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Abstract: Web-based malicious software (malware) has been increasing over the 
Internet. It poses threats to computer users through Web sites. Computers are infected 
with Web-based malware by drive-by-download attacks. Drive-by-download attacks 
force users to download and install the Web-based malware without being aware of it. 
These attacks evade detection by using automatic redirections to various Web sites. It 
is difficult to detect these attacks because each redirection uses the obfuscation 
technique. This paper analyzes the HTTP communication data of drive-by-download 
attacks. The results show significant features of the malicious redirections that are 
used effectively when we detect malware. 
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1. Introduction 
Damage resulting from Web-based malware has been increasing. Web-based malware uses a 
drive-by-download technique as its attack methods. Drive-by-download attacks force computer 
users to download and install malware without being aware of it by exploiting the vulnerabilities 
in a Web browser or some external components [1]. Figure 1 illustrates a typical drive-by-
download attack. A user accessing an entrance site is redirected to malicious Web sites in 
sequence. These consist of three separate Web sites. A zombie site redirects the user to the next 
zombie site or an attack site. The zombie site is used as a stepping stone. An attack site exploits 
the vulnerabilities of the user’s Web browser and forces the user to download malware from the 
malware distribution site, which contains malicious script codes or contents. These script codes 
are difficult to analyze because they are often obfuscated. Therefore, it is not easy to detect 
zombie-site URLs, attack-site URLs, and malware-distribution-site URLs used in drive-by-
download attacks. 
There are two problems related to drive-by-download attacks. The first problem is that 
malicious Web sites attack users only when they access the malicious Web sites. This makes it 
difficult to detect the malicious Web sites because users only access them occasionally. The 
second problem is that a normal Web site may be compromised, causing it to play the role of an 
entrance site or a zombie site in drive-by-download attacks. An infected popular site like a social 
network service will impact a large number of users. The drive-by-download attack increases the 
risk to Internet users. Ensuring the security of the Internet poses a serious problem in daily life. 
 
Figure 1. Drive-by-download attack. 
There have been numerous research projects regarding drive-by-download attacks based on 
the measurement and analysis of malicious contents.  
Egele et al. [2] illustrated and analyzed malicious JavaScript codes. They proposed building 
defensive mechanisms into a Web browser to mitigate the threats that arise from drive-by-
download attacks. Their study showed a successful approach for mitigating drive-by-download 
attacks based on malicious script codes. 
In this paper, we propose a new detection method for drive-by-download attacks using 
features of the malicious redirections. Our new method is not limited to JavaScript analysis 
because we observe a sequence of packets between a Web browser and servers. 
Cova et al. [3] presented a method for the detection and analysis of malicious JavaScript 
codes. They developed a system that uses numerous features and applied machine-learning 
techniques to discriminate the characteristics of normal JavaScript code. Their system can 
identify anomalous JavaScript codes by emulating the behaviors and comparing them to the 
normal JavaScript profile. Their system specializes in JavaScript codes. 
In addition to JavaScript codes, this paper covers other features such as HTTP methods and 
URL information. It should be noted here that the evaluation of JavaScript codes is very 
expensive. Therefore, although we consider only the existence of JavaScript codes, our method 
does not analyze the code in detail. 
2. Newly Proposed Method 
This paper proposes a new method for finding the hidden malicious URLs in drive-by-
download attacks by analyzing redirections from captured HTTP communication data packets. It 
is relatively easy to trace redirections in HTTP communication by looking for the referrer (or 
referer) fields in GET requests and HTTP responses. However, JavaScript codes can hide a 
referrer field in the malicious redirections of drive-by-download attacks. This is why a simple 
approach, like a blacklist of malicious URLs, does not work effectively. In fact, we find that the 
occurrence of a referrer field in malicious redirection accounts for only 10% of malicious attacks. 
In this paper, we analyze the HTTP communication data captured in controlled environment 
where only the drive-by-download attacks exist. We describe this data-capturing environment 
later. We try to reveal the features of the redirection to make it possible to detect unknown 
malicious attacks effectively. 
2.1. Taxonomy: Session and Server 
We define a session as a chain of packet flows. It starts from a DNS name resolution, 
continues with an initial three-way handshake in TCP followed by HTTP communications, and 
finally finishes with FIN or RST packets in TCP. We can trace a session by sorting with 
SEQ/ACK numbers in TCP using the same MAC address, IP address, and port number. 
We next define a server. A server is identified by an IP address and domain name1. When we 
access a Web site, we connect to a Web server or servers, and the Web browser establishes 
sessions with the Web server or servers. 
 
Figure 2. Session and server 
                                                          
1 We need to use an IP address and domain name pair because we can operate other domain names 
with the same IP address by using the DNS round robin and the virtual domain mechanism. 
2.2. Test Range 
Web browsers have a progressive rendering function that accelerates the rendering of a Web 
page. This function evaluates data such as HTML files and JavaScript files immediately after the 
download. For this reason, we start by analyzing the data from GET requests and define the test 
range. The three above mentioned test methods are applied to GET requests and the HTTP 
responses generated from the GET requests. HTTP responses are analyzed for 120 seconds time 
intervals. We defined this time interval empirically using a preliminary experiment that 
measured the time interval from the generation of redirection to the download of the first 
malware. Therefore, this range depends on the network environment, including the bandwidth 
and number of connected users. 
2.3. New Method 1: URL Test 
Our new method consists of three tests for detecting redirections. The first test investigates 
URLs. The URL test detects redirections by picking up URLs from an HTML content file and a 
location field from an HTTP response header. Thus, the URL test covers two methods. 
The first method analyzes all of the characters in an HTML content file and extracts URLs. 
We assume that all of the HTML files targeted for analysis are from an entrance site because we 
are only analyzing the communication of drive-by-download attacks. In addition, we assume that 
all of the following HTTP communications will be made automatically by the attack. We look 
for GET requests to the above mentioned URL list. When the URL list has GET requests, we 
consider that these requests were generated by the redirection. 
The second method gets a URL from the “location” field in an HTTP response header. At 
this point, the HTTP response header includes the HTTP status code “3xx,” which indicates a 
redirection to the URL set in the location field. 
2.4. New Method 2: Referrer Test 
The referrer test detects redirections based on the referrer field of the GET request. If the 
previous URL is set in the referrer field of the GET request, we can trace the redirection. When 
we move to a newly clicked URL, the origin site URL is set as the referrer field.  
2.5. New Method 3: Host Test 
The above mentioned URL test and referrer test are straightforward methods for detecting 
redirections. However, these methods cannot detect redirections when URLs are obfuscated or 
no referrer redirection is generated by JavaScript. In this paper, we solve these problems by 
using the host test, which analyzes the servers and sessions. 
First, we collect the list of all of the servers and sessions in the communication data. We call 
this list the first list. Next, we analyze the communication data again and perform the URL test 
(2.3) and referrer test (2.4) for each entrance Web site. Some servers and sessions are found to be 
redirected. We put the redirected servers and sessions into the other list. We call the list the 
second list. Finally, if any sessions in the first list are not covered by either the URL test or 
referrer test, we investigate the remaining HTTP communications in detail. If there are any 
sessions in the first list with the known servers that appear in the second list, these sessions are 
classified as redirected sessions and belong to the same redirection group as the URL test and 
referrer test. 
The host test is based on the fact that many Web pages are managed by a small number of 




Figure 3. First list and Second list 
Each vertical rectangle shows a session. A session contains a DNS name resolution (D), 3-
way handshake (S), HTTP communication (G, H), and FIN or RST packets (F). Each session 
indicates the first packet arrival time of the session at the top of the rectangle. 1:15.4 means 1 
minute and 15.4 seconds past from the origin of the timer. 
The leftmost session at 1:15.4 is generated by a user who click an entrance Web site URL. If 
URL test or referrer test identifies sessions at 1:17.0, 1:19.1, and 1:20.4 as sessions generated 
from the entrance Web site, then the sessions identified in the first list are put into the second list 
in Figure 3. 




In Figure 3, sessions at 1:18.1 and 1:24.4 are not identified by URL test or referrer test 
because of obfuscating. These sessions started within 120 seconds from the timestamp of the 
entrance session and they communicated with the same server. Therefore, the host test classifies 
these sessions into the same redirection group. However, the session at 10:13:6 is not classified 
into the same redirection group because the session started about 10 minutes later from the 
redirection and out of the test range of 120 seconds (2.2). 
We found redirections by three tests from the first list, and put the result in the second list.  
2.6. Malware Detection 
The purpose of a drive-by-download attack is to force a victim to download the malware. 
Therefore, when a Web browser downloads executable files, we can determine that these 
redirections are malicious. We used the data captured under a controlled environment containing 
a collection of drive-by-download attacks. The data was provided by the Malware Workshop 
2010 Datasets project in Japan to facilitate data analysis in the security research area [4]. In this 
study, we used the D3M 2010 datasets in the MWS 2010 datasets. The D3M 2010 datasets 
contain accessed URL lists, which are found on a public URL black list [6], along with 
previously detected drive-by-download attacks. They collected malicious communication data 
using a Web client honeypots called Marionette [5]. Marionette does not execute the downloaded 
malware, even though it comes under attack because of its vulnerabilities. The D3M 2010 
datasets were captured on March 8th, 9th, and 11th of 2010. We can observe the detection 
performance for the malicious redirection by successfully detect the download of executable files 
using the three proposed test methods. 
3. Results of Experiments 
We implemented the program to evaluate the performance of our newly proposed methods.  
3.1. Program Execution Example 
Figure 4 shows a portion of the results from the program. 
 
Figure 4. Program execution.
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In Figure 4, the first line indicates the 54th packet to obtain the HTML file. Subsequently, the 
Web browser obtains seven JPEG files from the same domain, and the next part refers to other 
domain files. We can see that the 176th, 210th, and 248th Web pages are zombie sites because 
these URLs contain suspicious characters such as “download” and use ephemeral port numbers 
rather than the port number (80). The indent in Figure 4 represents a reference or a redirection 
identified by using the URL test or the referrer test. The contents from 79 to 210 are generated 
from the 54th HTML file. Similarly, the 248th PHP file is generated from the 210th PHP file. 
Finally, the Web browser accesses the file called “banner.php”, and we confirm the information 
from the HTTP response header fields such as “exe (Inline)” and “octet-stream”. We can thus 
identify it as an executable file. This means the 759th line indicates a redirection, and it is 
classified into the same redirection group as the host test. We cannot identify the origin site of 
this redirection.  
Figure 4 also shows that the Web browser accesses various Web sites (domains) and 
downloads an executable file (malware) by merely accessing an HTML file.  
3.2. Test Performance 
We counted the success rate for each test to acquire the malware distribution URLs. The 
results are listed in the following table. 








Total of malicious URLs 202 205 158 
 
URL test 12 (5.9%) 10 (4.9%) 10 (6.3%) 
Referrer test 13 (6.4%) 13 (6.3%) 6 (3.8%) 
Host test 177 (87.6%) 182 (88.8%) 142 (89.9%) 
                                                          












759:('exe(Inline)', 'octet-stream') http://****eegh.in:3126/download/banner.php?spl=mdac 
3.3. Using Obfuscated JavaScript 
We discovered that obfuscated JavaScript codes are used as entrance sites and zombie sites 
with a probability of 100% in the D3M 2010 datasets. The obfuscated JavaScript codes are used 
not only for HTML files but also for PDF files. 
We discovered objects that are used frequently in obfuscated JavaScript codes for example, 
the eval function, String object’s functions (fromCharCode, replace, split, and so on), 
and location objects. 
3.4. HTTP Header Parameters: Referrer Field, Server Field, and Vary Field 
By analyzing the HTTP response header parameters, we discovered three significant features 
of malicious redirections. First, most redirections to malware distribution sites are not simple 
referrer redirections to hide the attack origin site. The attackers use JavaScript codes and force 
Web browsers to download malware with no explicit referrer. Second, some malware 
distribution servers use Nginx rather than Apache for the Web server. Third, a number of HTTP 
response headers set “User-Agent” in the Vary field3.  
3.5. URL Features 
Attackers use specific parameters for GET variables. They use GET variables such as “sql” 
and “mdac” and set the user’s environment variables. One example is the URL 
“http://hoge.com?sql=2&br=MSIE&vers=6.0”. Additionally, sometimes an IP address and 
ephemeral port are also used in a variable, like the 759th packet in Figure 4. 
3.6. Using Fake Files 
We investigated “Content-Type” fields and counted these fields at the HTTP responses of the 
downloaded malware. We discovered malware and attack scripts faked to image files. 
3.7. Features Utilization Ratio 
We obtained the data listed in the following table after analyzing the usage rates for the above 
mentioned features in D3M 2010. 
 
 
                                                          
3 When the contents are changed for the User-Agent, the Vary field is set to “User-Agent”; for example, 
“Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)” in the D3M 2010. User-Agent is a field that is 
used to distinguish the model of the browser or mobile. 








Total of malicious redirections 98 89 77 
 
Obfuscated JavaScript 98 (100%) 89 (100%) 77 (100%) 
No referrer redirection 89 (90.8%) 79 (88.8%) 75 (97.4%) 
PDF + JavaScript 35 (35.7%) 33 (37.1%) 25 (32.5%) 
URL Feature 38 (38.8%) 30 (33.7%) 24 (31.2%) 
Vary: User-Agent 29 (29.6%) 27 (30.3%) 25 (32.5%) 
Server: Nginx 29 (29.6%) 24 (27.0%) 21 (27.3%) 
Ephemeral Port 8 (8.2%) 5 (5.6%) 10 (13.0%) 
Fake files 7 (7.1%) 6 (6.7%) 4 (5.2%) 
 
Table 2 indicates that the use of obfuscated JavaScript codes with no referrer redirection can 
be used as the fingerprints of malicious redirections because these features are used 100% of the 
time. Additionally, Table 2 implies that the use of an ephemeral port and fake files are significant 
features because normal Web sites do not use them. 
3.8. Unique IP Address in Redirection 
Figure 5 shows the number of unique IP addresses in each redirection. It also shows that a 
single IP address has been used heavily. This means attackers often operate a number of domains 
with a small number of IP addresses using a virtual domain. Such a feature is also an effective 
criterion to detect malicious redirection. 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of unique IP address in redirections. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We analyzed communication data captured in an environment where only the communication 
data of drive-by-download attacks existed. We found the significant features of malicious 
redirection. The new methods successfully detected the redirections by using these features. Our 
future plans are to evaluate the extraction method of malicious redirections by using the acquired 
features from normal and malicious communication data and to apply the proposed methods to 
communication data captured in various networks. 
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